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ABSTRACT
MEGAN EARLINE NORRIS:
Transitions: Decentralization and Senegalese Political Parties
(Under the direction of Timothy Nordstrom)
This thesis seeks to examine the role that decentralization and political parties
have played in Senegalese democratization from colonial time to present. By examining
five influential time periods in modem Senegalese history, this thesis investigates the
evolving nature of the Senegalese political system in relation to its current democracy.
The first chapter discusses Senegal’s colonial background and the legacy of centralization
left by the French. Chapter two explores the decolonization process in Fiench West
Africa and its specific impact on Senegal. The remainder of the thesis studies the terms
of the three presidents that have led Senegal since its independence from France in 1960,
beginning with Leopold Sedar Senghor and tlien his successor, Abdou Diouf. These two
men mled Senegal for forty years and consolidated political power in the hands of the
Parti Social]ste with only nominal decentralization for m.ost of their time in office.
Towards the latter part of Dioufs mle, however, a gradual decentralization process was
implemented, loosening the control of the Parti Socialiste and allowing for competition
with other political parties, most importantly v/ith the Parti Democratique Senegalais.
The final section then considers the impact of Senegal’s first transfer of power from the
Parti Socialiste to the PartJ Democratique Senegalais under leader Abdoulaye Wade. As
this study reveals, Senegal underwent a gradual democratization process. Increased
levels of democracy accompanied decentralization of government powers and increased
pally competition. The refomi.s of the current administration point towai'ds further
democratic consolidation in Senegal.
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Introduction
This study of Senegalese political history from colonial times to present seeks to
determine how the interplay between decentralization and the evolving role of political
parties in Senegal has affected that country’s ability to establish and consolidate a
democracy. Senegal was once grouped with seven other West African colonies under
French colonial rule as Afrique Occidentale Francaise(AOF). During this time, the
Senegalese government was ordered around the French system, and much of this
organization remained during the decolonization process and the following years during
which Senegal worked to establish its own government. Senegal has been considered an
electoral democracy for a number of years with a period of significant political reform
beginning in 1975. But the government party remained strong and dominant, and it was
not until March of 2000 that an opposition party was actually elected to government. The
peaceful transfer of power that followed marked a significant milestone in Senegal’s
transition to a more comprehensive democracy. This thesis will examine how the shift
from a centralized, single-party system to a more decentralized, multi-party system
influenced Senegal’s move towards democracy and its subsequent ability to consolidate
that democracy.
A focus of this thesis will be the centralized nature of Senegal’s governmental
structures beginning with the colonial system through to the independent democratic
system. The French colonial legacy is that of a highly centralized governmental system.
Unfortunately, this centralization may be a deterrent to democracy, as Larry Diamond
notes in Developing Democracy (1999). He proposes that delegating greater authority to
local governments is a means of facilitating democratic development. Richard Vengroff
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has investigated this connection between decentralization and democracy by examining
the role of decentralization in Senegal’s democratic transition (“Decentralization,
Democratization and Development in Senegal” 2000; “Senegal: The Evolution of a Quasi
Democracy” 1997). In this process, Senegal moved from the highly centralized system
established during French colonial rule to a more decentralized system, allowing for
greater governmental participation for more groups within the national framework. In
keeping with these ideas, my thesis will examine exactly what types of changes have
taken place and how these changes in governmental structures have affected Senegal’s
ability to consolidate democracy. My hypothesis is that the highly centralized, single
party system established after independence had a negative effect on democracy in
Senegal but that moves towards a decentralized, multi-party system have improved
conditions for democracy.
A second focus of this thesis is how party dynamics have influenced Senegal’s
gradual transition from colony to democracy. Political parties and elections are
interconnected variables in the democratization process that reflect the democratic
integrity of a system. According to Scott Mainwaring (1998)the institutionalization of
political parties is key to establishing a solid democracy. He continues by asserting that
institutionalized party systems show certain characteristics, among them regular patterns
of party competition, strong societal party roots, a socially and politically legitimized
party system, and organized and professionalized party organizations. Elections are a
means of gauging the stability of the party system and hence of measuring a large
component of the nation’s level of democratic consolidation. Although different
democracies may have varying levels of consolidation, for a nation to be considered a
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consolidated democracy “elites, organizations, and the mass public must all believe that
the political system [democracy] they actually have in their country is worth obeying and
defending”(Diamond 1999, 66). Consolidation may develop quickly or gradually, and it
is by no means a certain outcome even after the first steps to democracy have been taken
(Mainwaring 1998). In the context of Senegal, political parties and elections are
particularly interesting because of the contrast between Senegalese elections and those of
other African nations. Senegal is one of the few nations in West Africa that has never
experienced a military coup, and, in such company, a nation that holds free and fair
elections followed by a peaceful transfer of power is truly remarkable. Because this
outcome is relatively rare, an examination of the processes behind these events,
beginning with the inception of these political parties in the early twentieth century, may
be useful in determining their causes and Senegal’s potential to further consolidate its
democracy.
This study is valuable in that it takes theories of decentralization and political
party systems and applies them to the specific case of Senegal in order to determine how
these ideas function in this case. When examining Senegal, this study will investigate the
influences and obstacles in the way of a third wave democracy consolidating its
government. This thesis is broken down into five main chapters, each focusing on a
distinct chapter in Senegalese history. Each chapter begins with an historical overview of
the period and then moves into an examination of Senegal’s governmental structure as it
either remains centralized or moves towards decentralization. These chapters will also
consider how political parties developed and the role they had in shaping the politics of
the period.
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The first period to consider is that of early colonialism, from the first French
outpost in 1659 up through 1944 and the Vichy regime. This chapter sets the context for
Senegal’s development as a nation and the colonial government from which Senegal’s
modem government sprang. In examining France’s assimilationist policies regarding
Senegal, this chapter investigates Senegal’s educational system, its governmental
stmcture and the special privileges afforded the colony. During this period, Senegal’s
first political parties began to develop as Senegalese participated in both colonial and
French politics. This chapter will examine the origins of these parties and the influence
they had on Senegal’s educated elites.
The second period in Senegalese history that this study will cover is the time from
the Brazzaville Conference in 1944 through Senegalese independence in 1960. This
period is marked by significant political wrangling both within the colonies and between
the colonies and France. This chapter looks into the changing French policy towards
Senegal as the French foreign empire began to cmmble. As Senegal worked through the
ideas of a French Union, the Loi Cadre, and its attempted federation with French Soudan,
it fluctuated between policies of centralization and decentralization in its relations with
France and with other West African nations. Also during this period, many African
political parties appeared on the scene, vying for power and working to sort through the
tangled maneuvers of decolonization. This second chapter seeks to examine the interplay
between these forces of centralization and decentralization as varying political parties
stmggled for power.
Chapter three discusses the presidency of Leopold-Sedar Senghor, the first
president of independent Senegal and the founder of the Parti Socialiste, the political
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party that dominated Senegalese politics for over forty years. This chapter traces
Senghor’s consolidation of his power in Senegal from the withdrawal from the Mali
Federation, through the 1963 constitution, to his establishment of Abdou Diouf as his
chosen successor. Some political opposition was allowed during this period as Senghor
somewhat eased restrictions on the formation of political parties, but this chapter will
discuss the role Senghor’s policies served on Senegal’s road to democracy.
The fourth chapter concerns the presidency of Abdou Diouf, Senghor’s
handpicked successor to the Senegalese presidency. During this period Senegal faced
mounting foreign pressure towards decentralization and political reform, and the Parti
Socialiste’s grip on Senegalese politics began to weaken in the face of economic
difficulties. This chapter discusses the reforms instituted during Dioufs presidency as
well as the emerging presence of Abdoulaye Wade and the Parti Democratique
Senegalais.
Chapter five examines the 2000 presidential election and Wade’s victory over
Diouf. The subsequent peaceful transfer of power was a significant milestone in
Senegalese politics, and chapter five will analyze the events leading up to that change of
power as well as the reforms that have taken place since Wade came to power. This
chapter will study both the emergence of new political parties in Senegal and the
structural reforms implemented by the new government.
In conclusion, this thesis seeks to take the theories surrounding the role of
decentralization and political parties in a democracy and consider them in the light of
Senegal’s transition to democracy. By applying the ideas of decentralization and political
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parties to their actual development in Senegal, we can obtain a clearer perspective on the
validity of these arguments when they are applied to specific instead of general situations.

I,

I ;
i
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Chapter One:
French Colonialism: 1659-1944
Historical Context
The French first established a presence in Senegal in 1659 with their military
outpost of St. Louis(Crowder 1967). In 1678 the island city of Goree was acquired from
the Dutch (Hargreaves 1969), and the French established the settlements of Dakar and
Rufisque. These four settlements formed the Quatre Communes that would serve as
urban centers of government,education, and political privilege. The remainder of
modem day Senegal was not brought under French control until 1854 when General
Louis Faidherbe led his army in subduing the region, acquiring for France about one third
of the territory that marks the current boundaries of Senegal and extending French mle
into the hinterlzinds (Crowder 1967).
French settlement in Senegal was never very extensive, though the French
soldiers living in Senegal did help create a mulatto population that would play a
significant role in Senegalese politics. Settlement attempts were made in the areas
surrounding St. Louis from 1819 through about 1827 as a part of agricultural
experiments, but these attempts were largely unsuccessful, and the idea of large-scale
settlement in Senegal was abandoned (Crowder 1967). As a result, Senegal did not face
the racial problems of a large settler community that were encountered by many other
colonies. Some Frenchmen did live in Senegal and participate in politics during the
colonial era, but native Africans remained the vast majority of people living in Senegal.
Although many nineteenth century French preached the idea of the mission
civilitrice, or civilizing mission, insisting that France’s duty was to bring the light of
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French civilization to the African natives, France’s focus in its colonies remained
predominantly economic and military. From an economic standpoint, Senegal provided
France with the traditional colonial economy,exporting natural resources and importing
manufactured goods. After the abolition of the slave trade in the 1820s, groundnut
production became the core of the Senegalese economy. Under the direction of the
marabouts, Muslim leaders who controlled villages in Senegal, peasant farming produced
the groundnuts that were Senegal’s chief export for France (Griffeth, Johnson ed. 1985).
Thus, France sought to profit from its power in Senegal, even as it was preaching the
values of the mission civilitrice.
Centralization
The first issue to discuss within the context of the French presence in Senegal is
that of centralization. Since this paper explores the ways in which decentralization has
affected Senegal’s transition from colony to democracy, it is important to first consider
the centralized system with which Senegal began. In Senegal the nature of that
centralization is embodied in the French policy of assimilation. Assimilation was the
French way of accepting that the Senegalese had the potential to be equal human beings
while still regtirding their culture as inferior or nonexistent. The result of these opinions
was the French mission civilitrice which sought to turn Africans into Frenchmen through
education, economic development and democratic participation. Although this policy
often met with opposition and was never fully applied, it formed the basis of French
government in Senegal beginning in the early nineteenth century when France began
expanding its colonial holdings in Senegal.
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The French policy of assimilation was by nature highly centralized because it
involved the native culture and governmental structure being completely subsumed by
the colonizing culture in a direct instead of delegated system of governance. Unlike the
British colonial system that utilized existing governmental structures, the French sought
to completely replace the existing framework with the French system.
The French methods of assimilation took on several forms. First, the French
sought to assimilate the Senegalese to their culture through education. Though this
approach was limited to urban and upper-class elites, education proved a very effective
means of shaping the Senegalese into the French mindset. At the outset of FrenchSenegalese interaction, the mulatto children of Frenchmen bom in Senegal were educated
by their fathers in the 1700s, and the resulting class of educated elites formed the basis
for native Senegalese political power through the 1920s(Crowder 1967). During the
mid-1800s, the education provided at such institutions as the Lycee Faidherbe and the
Lycee Van Vollenhoven, as well as the Ecole Normale William Ponty, would develop the
generation of Senegalese leaders who would question France’s assimilation policy and
even begin to agitate for independence(Crowder 1967). The education that was so key in
developing this class of assimilated elites, however, was not necessarily available to the
outlying areas of Senegal. Even in 1947, only 12.4 percent of school age children in
Senegal were attending school, leaving the vast majority of the population uneducated.
In comparison to other French colonies at the time, however, Senegal’s education rate
was significantly higher. In Guinea, the percentage of school age children actually
attending school was only 1.3 percent, and in Soudan, that figure was only 5 percent
(Crowder 1967). So, the French did make some headway in educating the Senegalese
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population. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, conquering General Faidherbe did
help to increase educational opportunities in Senegal by establishing a school for chiefs’
sons, opening secular schools for Muslims, and even awarding scholarships for study in
St. Louis and in France(Crowder 1967). All of these institutions allowed France to
conquer through the education and assimilation of the native population, as well as
through the more traditional means of military conquest.
A peculiarity in the French system that marked Senegal as a special target of the
assimilationist policy was the granting of citizenship to inhabitants of the Quatre
Communes in 1848. This law took great steps in assimilating the Quatre Communes to
mainland France by declaring them communes de plein exercise (Crowder 1967). With
this classification as a citoyen came certain privileges, such as voting. Indeed this status
allowed citizens the full rights and privileges of any other French citizen, in theory at
least, if not in practice. Furthermore, citizens of the Quatre Communes, unlike those who
gained French citizenship through a naturalization process, were allowed to maintain
their statut personnel, or traditional law in matters of marriage, inheritance and such
(Crowder 1967). This right of citizenship was a significant concession because it
increased the legal status of the inhabitants of the Quatre Communes, granting them
rights that laid the groundwork for further experiments with the democratic process.
The generous assimilationist policy that was practiced in the Quatre Communes,
however, can also be used to illustrate the deficiencies of the French policy. The granting
of citizenship was limited to those residents of the Quatre Communes. Those Senegalese
living outside of the Quatre Communes were considered merely sujets, subjects of French
imperialism and not actively included citizens. This status of sujet predominated among
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the peoples of French West Africa and carried with it certain restrictions and obligations.
Sujets were required to perform forced labor up through the 1930s when France signed
the Geneva Act prohibiting forced colonial labor. Unlike citoyens of the Quatre
Communes, the sujets remained under the authority of their chiefs who acted as agents of
the French government(Crowder 1967). This dual system created a great disparity in
education and democracy between the urban elites of the Quatre Communes and the
disenfranchised poor living in the countryside. France’s half-implementation of its
assimilation policy created a basis for democracy in the cities while keeping the
countryside subdued. As a result, the Senegalese population was divided, and the
democratic process was restricted in the colony in order to maintain the central power of
France.
The French colonial government in Senegal was handled in the tradition of French
imperialism. That is to say, it was highly centralized, with intensive involvement by
French officials and by the government in Paris itself. This highly centralized system
was first organized through a 1904 constitution for French West Africa. Under this
constitution and subsequent decrees, France established a chain of command in Senegal
and the rest of the AOF that formed the basis for a highly centralized colonial structure.
Beginning in Paris, authority over the colonies officially rested with the Chamber of
Deputies, but in reality this authority was delegated to the Colonial Minister who ruled by
decree with the Conseil Superieur de la France d’Outre-Mer. Under the Colonial
Minister, the governor-general, advised by the Conseil de Gouvemement(but with no
obligation to take its advice) mled over the affairs of the Afrique Occidentale Francaise
(French West Africa—AOF). The governor-general alone held the right of direct
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correspondence with Paris, and all communication had to take place through him,
including the presentation of colonial budgets. Under the governor-general was the
lieutenant governor(made full governor after 1937)of each colony. In the other colonies
of the AOF,this lieutenant governor was advised by a Conseil d’Administration that, like
the other advisory councils in the colonial chain of command, had little real power.
Senegal, however, was a significant exception to that rule, as it was granted the right to a
Colonial Council that possessed certain quasi-legislative powers over finances(Folz
1965). This distinct privilege—though still greatly limited—that was afforded Senegal is
another example of France’s partially implemented policy of assimilation to French
norms of democracy. The Colonial Council, however, is actually a later form of what
had been called the General Council, representation on which had been limited to the
citoyens of the Quatre Communes. When France transformed this body into the Colonial
Council, the outlying regions of Senegal were also represented. Although on the surface
this move gave greater representation to the sujets of the hinterlands, in actuality the
chiefs who represented them were so aligned with the French government that they did
little more than hamper the efforts of the citoyens of the Quatre Communes. This
Council did give the Senegalese some first hand experience with democracy, though that
experience was limited to the strict confines of the French hierarchy, and its actions were
subject to the governor-general’s veto (Crowder 1967). As a result, France maintained its
highly centralized system of governance, but Senegal did get to experience the
beginnings of democratic institutions.
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Political Parties
During this period of Senegalese history, political parties were just beginning to
make their way into government. Several examples of early parties, however, can be
found in examining the elections of early Senegalese politicians. The first of these
nationally recognized politicians was Blaise Daigne, who was elected to the French
National Assembly in 1914. The first African elected to such a post, Diagne was
supported by a political group called the Young Senegalese. This group was made up of
the expropriated landowners of Cap Vert, Muslim leaders, and French-educated
intellectuals seeking to preserve the privileges of the Quatre Communes. Leaders such as
these would rise to political power in Senegal throughout its history, both during
colonization and after independence.
The most significant political party in modem Senegalese history found its roots
in the 1930s with a young leader named Lamine Gueye. As a Dakar lawyer, Lamine
Gueye was definitely from the upper class intelligentsia, but the socialist party that he
worked to bring to Senegal served as an organization for combating the conservatism of
Daigne’s old age. Lamine Gueye defeated Daigne and was elected to the French
National Assembly with the backing of the Senegalese socialist party. Once elected,
Lamine Gueye proceeded to push for full political rights for all of the AOF and would
continue to serve as an advocate for his country through the subsequent stmggle for
independence from France(Thompson, Adloff 1957). The socialist party that he
organized would become the dominate party of Senegalese politics. Through party
organizations such as these, Senegalese were beginning to take a more active role in their
government,even while still under French colonial mle.
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Conclusion
Overall, the early colonial period in Senegal was a time of gradual French
expansion into the region, and with that expansion came the increased involvement of the
French government. This colonial government was built along the centralized system of
the French using a policy of assimilation. The French did not merely want to conquer
territory; they wanted to bring the peoples of that territory into French culture, to
assimilate them to the French way of life. Because the French sought both cultural and
military domination in Senegal, this process involved replacing the existing structures
with French organizational structures. Education thus proved to be a vital tool for
teaching French ideals to the native population because it trained the people from youth
to accept French thinking.
The uneven application of the principles of assimilation, however, is also vital in
understanding the French domination of the region. Residents of the Quatre Communes
were citizens. Residents of mral areas remained subjects. Citizens could experiment
with rudimentary forms of democracy. Subjects were left under the domination of local
chiefs answering to French authority. This mixed heritage formed the basis upon which
the Senegalese would build their nation. And they did begin to build a political identity
during the latter years of this period through the proto-party the Young Senegalese and
then through the organization of the Senegalese socialist party. The political legacy left
to them by the French carried with it certain benefits as well as certain disadvantages.
The Quatre Communes of Senegal were unique in their status as citizens eind ability to
participate in colonial government. This aspect of French rule helped shape a basis for
democracy in Senegalese government. But the sujets of the countryside, along with the
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citizens of the Quatre Communes, were still under the highly centralized mle of the
French. And whatever influence the citizens of the Quatre Communes had was miniscule
in comparison to the hierarchy established by the French for the rule of the AOF. It was
from this highly centralized system that the Senegalese would begin to break away from
French domination through the development of political parties and national politics.
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Chapter Two
Transitions to Independence: 1944-1960
Historical Context
As the Allies were pushing towards victory in Europe in World War n,Charles de
Gaulle began formulating policy for a post-war empire. A conference for determining
this policy was held in Brazzaville in 1944. At the Brazzaville Conference, the Free
French government decided that French colonial holdings would remain under French
authority. As a result of this determination, the Brazzaville Conference established a
Federal Assembly for France and the colonies and also allowed them representation at the
assembly writing the Fourth Republic constitution (Crowder 1967). These actions were a
significant move for France because they marked a change from the former policy of
assimilation to a newer policy of association. France was determined to maintain its
control in the region, but it did acknowledge that restructuring was necessary.
The decisions made at Brazzaville set the framework for the French Union. That
Union was established with the constitution of the Fourth Republic. Both Lamine Gueye
and Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal served as African representatives in the
Constituent Assembly for drafting the French constitution. Two versions of the
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constitution were drafted. The first draft constitution endorsed by the African leaders
took a liberal approach to the status of the colonies, that followed a highly assimilationist
policy. But, many Frenchmen feared that France would become subject to her own
colonies, should such a constitution pass, and it was defeated in metropolitan France.
The second draft on the constitution was passed, and it took a much less liberal view of
the colonies (Crowder 1967). The French Union replaced the former colonial system and
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emphasized the French resolve to maintain control over the colonies of the AOF by
insisting upon association instead of independence, while still retaining French authority
(Thompson, Adloff 1957). As the French began to realize that full implementation of the
assimilation policy could mean enormous powers for their African subjects, they
abandoned that policy in favor of association so as to maintain French rule without
sacrificing the power of the French people.
Another development in French-African relations was the loi cadre, issued by
France to the AOF in June 1956. This law granted semi-autonomy and parliaments for
the territories along with a general franchise, thus increasing the electorate in the AOF to
over ten million people and forming mdimentary states from administrative districts
(Wilson 1994). Although the loi cadre seemed to grant greater authority to the Africans
themselves, the Senegalese leader Leopold Sedar Senghor was highly critical of the
move, arguing that it undermined the ability of the territories to act jointly by denying a
federalized executive. Without a federal structure, each territory was left to act
independently, thereby undercutting the strength of a potential union. In effect, this
division reduced the influence of the African territories in comparison with that of the
French government(Crowder 1967). The loi cadre was prohibitive of African unity and
therefore prevented effective organization in African dealings with France.
In 1958, the French Community under the new constitution of the Fifth Republic
replaced the French Union of the old Fourth Republic. This transition, however, was not
without contention. Under the direction of Charles de Gaulle, the West African states
were bullied into either accepting the terms of the Fifth Republic constitution and French
Community or being totally cut off from France. One of the most controversial aspects
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of the French Community was that it divided what had been the colony of French West
Africa into its individual territories and required the territories to work individually with
France instead of allowing the territories to work together as a union. The divisive work
that began with the hi cadre came to a head with the more extreme regulations of the
Fifth Republic. A united French West Africa could have been strong and politically
influential, so when de Gaulle forced the territories to remain separate, he effectively
limited their potential for power. Senegal under Senghor’s leadership did not agree with
the way the French Community divided the AOF into its individual member states and
accused France of trying to balkanize Africa and weaken African political influence. In
the end, however, Senegal decided that it was not strong enough to become an enemy of
France and so found it necessary to accept the terms of the Fifth Republic constitution.
In the resulting French Community, member states practiced self-governance but came
together in affairs such as foreign policy, defense, and the economy (Foltz 1965). The
political division that arose from this arrangement would later have an impact on the
shaping of post-colonial Africa as national parties and leaders emerged from these
political structures.
In the years between World War II and independence, Senghor consistently
fought for a federation of West African states so that the individual territories would
stand together in their dealings with France and then eventually be able to form a viable
economic unit after independence from France. His attempts to this end, however, were
repeatedly blocked by the French government and by his rival Felix Houphouet-Boigny
of Cote d'Ivoire.
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Even though a federation of all former AOF countries could not be formed,in
January 1959 Senegal did manage to form a smaller federation known at the Mali
Federation. This federation originally included Senegal, French Soudan, Upper Volta,
and Dahomey. When Upper Volta and Dahomey withdrew from the union in February
1959, Senegal and Soudan remained (Foltz 1967). Senegal gained its independence from
France as a part of this Mali Federation on June 20,1960. After a few years of working
with the French Community, de Gaulle and the French government proved to be more
flexible in the granting of independence. After easing through the stages of the French
Union and then the French Community, the terms of independence granted to Senegal as
a part of the Mali Federation meant that the new nation could still depend on France for a
certain amount of aid, and the transition was made without completely severing all ties
between France and its former colonies (Foltz 1967). This gradual independence
provided Senegal with a safety net from France, but it also kept Senegal under France’s
centralized control for a longer period of time.
Centralization/Decentralization
In the years following World War II, France struggled to maintain its hold on its
colonies, and the French Union was a redefinition of the colonial system in the face of
nationalist demands. Although it replaced the old strict hierarchy, the French Union, also
reasserted France’s dominance in its overseas territories. In this way,the French Union
was a cross between maintaining the old centralized order and creating a new
decentralized system.
The Brazzaville Conference did, however, also take some steps towards
decentralization as it reconunended that assemblies should be established for each
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territory along with extended suffrage for Africans(Crowder 1967). Under the new
constitution in 1946, a General Council was established for all eight territories of French
West Africa. While this was a new development for the other territories, it simply
replaced the old Colonial Council that Senegal had previously known(Crowder 1967).
Special concessions made to Senegal in revamping the structure of colonial politics
included full municipal status for St. Louis, Dakar(which by then included Goree), and
Rustifique. Also, Senegal retained its single college electorate instead of the dual system
set in place in other colonies to ensure European representation. In Senegal Europeans
and Africans competed in the same races for political office (Crowder 1967). This time
period was one of great transition for most nations of French West Africa, but because of
Senegal’s unique historical status among the colonies, these reforms seemed less
revolutionary in Senegal than in other West African nations.
Like the policies of the Brazzaville Conference, the loi cadre was also a mixed
bag. If anything, the system it put in place maintained centralized rule through
decentralizing certain aspects of African government. The loi cadre called for
governments at the territorial level to form a federation with France. By dividing AOF
into individual territories, the loi cadre diminished the influence of each territory in
comparison to the weight of mainland France, thereby maintaining France’s centralized
power over its overseas holdings.
In the face of such division by the French government, the so-called
“Balkanization” of the AOF,certain African groups protested the loi cadre and began
working to form some African unity in an effort to increase the proportional influence of
the African territories. Leopold Sedar Senghor was among the most vocal in protesting
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the provisions of the loi cadre and began working to unite African politics through his
party the Independents d’Outre-Mer(lOM). The Senegalese branch of this organization,
the BDS (Bloc Democratique Senegalais)remained strong, but the lOM as a whole
lacked the strength to stop the political maneuverings of the Rassemblement
Democratique Africain(RDA), which maintained greater support in the rest of French
West Africa. The RDA was headed by Houphouet-Boigny of Cote d'Ivoire, a wealthy
territory that had grown tired of contributing large sums of its money to the AOF budget
(Foltz 1965). As a result, Houphouet-Boigny and Cote d'Ivoire often blocked Senghor’s
proposals for greater unification in the region, and the French policy of obtaining greater
centralized power through the decentralization and fragmentation of its territories
succeeded.
Political Parties
The SFIO had been Senegal’s first major party. With the SFIO,Lamine Gueye
had been elected to the French National Assembly, and it was in the SFIO that Senghor
first entered politics. Amid growing discontent with French assimilationist policies, the
SFIO suffered in African politics because it sided too strongly with French interests. As
a result, Senghor led a group in withdrawing from the party in 1947 and forming the Bloc
Democratique Senegelais(BDS)(Crowder 1967). Upon his withdrawal from the SFIO,
Senghor developed the BDS into an organization capable of defeating the incumbent
Lamine Gueye for a seat in the National Assembly and reducing the SFIO from its
dominant role in the territorial assembly to a meager nine out of fifty seats(Thompson,
Adloff 1957). The BDS was distinctive in not being allied to any European party and so
expressed the African ideals of negritude. The BDS promoted African socialism and
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increased autonomy, though it shied away from actually demanding independence
(Crowder 1967). The BDS had a more regional orientation than the SFIO did, and the
granting of voting privileges to the countryside in 1951 allowed it to surge ahead of its
predecessor with its swelling rural electorate(Thompson, Adloff 1957). As the BDS
grew to include more socialist groups it took the name Union Progressiste Senegalaise in
April 1958 to signify its changing character (Foltz 1965). The break the BDS made from
its more international origin in the SFIO was significant because it expressed the
increasingly decentralized nature of party politics in Senegal.
The struggle over a unified or divided West Afiica was rooted in many conflicting
debates. Senegal supported the idea of a strong and unified West Africa, but it did not
always follow through with unification efforts. This conflict can be seen in Senegal’s
participation in political parties that spanned the entire region. The Rassemblement
Democratique Africain(RDA)was a major political party throughout West Africa,
uniting African representation in the French National Assembly and setting the tone for
much of African politics. Senegal, however, was one of the few states not to support the
RDA,refusing even to send its delegates to the RDA’s initial meeting in Bamako. The
RDA enjoyed widespread support throughout the AOF,but its deepening communist
affiliations caused the withdrawal of Senegalese support(Aldoff, Thompson 1957). A
major complication in Senegal’s involvement with the RDA was its leader, HouphouetBoigny of Cote d'Ivoire. A personal rival of Senghor, Houphout-Boigny favored the
division of the AOF into its individual states and repeatedly blocked Senghor’s efforts to
form a united West Africa. As a consequence, Senghor attempted to form his own
interterritorial party, the Independents d’Outre-Mer(lOM)(Foltz 1965). During the
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period following World War II, the RDA gained political dominance in French West
Africa in every territory except for Senegal. In Senegal, the BDS managed to defeat the
SFIO and to overshadow all other political parties in the territory. In this example,the
increased localization of political parties in once again made clear. Even as Senghor was
seeking to provide greater African unity, he was still contributing to the fragmentation
that West Africa was experiencing.
The Parti de Regroupement Afficain(PRA)was an interterritorial coalition party
of nearly all major parties outside of the RDA. The PRA was dominated by its
Senegalese contingent and aligned African politics into two main blocs: the RDA led by
Houphouet-Boigny and the PRA led by Senegal. Thus, a sort of interterritorial two party
system was established, though each large party was really a loose combination of local
and territorial parties without a strongly centralized core. Houphout-Boigny favored a
system of independent territories linked individually to France, while Senghor continued
to lobby for a united West African government. It is difficult to say how these two
parties would have held a united front for African politics, however, because two months
after establishing this system, the French Fourth Republic fell, and Charles de Gaulle
stepped in as president of France to write a new constitution. With the new constitution
also came a new system for dealing with West Africa, and, as a member of de Gaulle’s
cabinet, Houphout-Boigny and his system of independent territories held sway in the new
French constitution. Each territory was given the option of either accepting its individual
status as a member of the French Community or of completely disassociating itself from
France. Few nations were able to take such a drastic step as complete independence, and
despite internal division and opposition to the terms of the agreement, all West African
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states except for Guinea voted in favor of the French Community,Senegal approving the
constitution with 97 percent of its voters (Foltz 1965). Thus,Senegal spent most of the
period from 1944 to 1960 struggling between decentralization and subordination to
France, on the one hand, and a centralized system that would allow greater African
power, on the other. In the end, the decentralized system won out, and Senegal began
making its own way, first as a member of the Mali Federation and then as a separate
nation.
Conclusion
This transition to independence marks a crucial portion of Senegalese history as
its leaders struggled to shape Senegalese identity in the context of French demands and
the needs of its African neighbors. Senegal had wanted greater independence through a
unified Africa, but instead it got total independence with a fragmented Africa. Even as
the Senegalese leader Senghor campaigned for unity, however, he moved farther away
from it in order to protect his own political interests. The division of African parties into
national parties furthered the fragmentation that African was experiencing in its dealings
with France. Throughout this period, therefore, Senegal was involved in an unintentional
decentralization process through its political parties and national organizations.
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Chapter Three
Leopold S^ar Senghor: 1960-1981
Historical Context
Upon gaining independence from France in 1960, Senegal was still joined with
the French Soudan in a union known as the Mali Federation. This union, however.
proved to be short-lived. When faced with the increasingly centralized nature of the Mali
Federation and the apparent domination of the Soudanese, Senegalese leaders began
considering withdrawal from the federation. The leader of the Senegalese territory,
Leopold Sedar Senghor, had spent his political career working towards African unity, and
the Mali Federation was the best organization he had been able to produce, but when the
politics of the federation began to turn against him, he began to reconsider his stance.
After analyzing his political chances, Senghor realized that he would not be able to
maintain power within the Mali Federation. His only hope of political dominance lay
within Senegal itself and not the federation as a whole. As a result, Senghor
compromised his ideal of African unity in order to preserve his own political power.
Through a series of quick maneuvers for political and military support, Senghor claimed
dominance within Senegal and sent the Soudanese leaders home without a fight. The 67
members of the Senegalese territorial assembly who were present at their midnight
meeting in late August 1960 declared Senegal an independent republic, and on September
26 Senegal adopted a new constitution. One week later, Leopold Sedar Senghor was
elected the first president of the independent Republic of Senegal(Foltz 1965). Senegal
had finally gained independence from France only to fragment further by breaking its

25

L

union with Soudan. This division, however, would serve to strengthen the centralized,
single-party state that Senghor was building around himself in Senegal.
The break-up of the Mali Federation was not the only action Senghor had to take
in order to consolidate his own political power within Senegal. He also had to establish
his dominance over men within his own party. Mamadou Dia had served as a leading
politician in Senegal alongside Senghor during the years leading up to and just following
independence. Dia served as Minister of Defense during the Mali Federation (Foltz
1967) and as prime minister of independent Senegal. In December 1962, however, Dia
launched an unsuccessful coup attempt against Senghor that resulted in the swift
suppression of all opposition and Dia’s imprisonment(Keesing’s Record of World
Events 1962). Following Prime Minister Mamadou Dia’s unsuccessful coup attempt,
Senghor took over the duties of prime minister and the Assembly granted him authority
to present a revised constitution to the Senegalese people. Accordingly, in March 1963,
Senegal voted to approve a new constitution. That constitution established a presidential
system and abolished the post of prime minister, thus further centralizing executive
authority for Senghor himself.
A few years after Senghor had done away with the post of prime minister as a part
of his suppression of the opposition movement of Mamadou Dia, he altered his position
on the topic. In 1969, Senghor himself presented an amendment to the 1963 constitution
that would reestablish the office of prime minister. The amendment, passed by
referendum in February 1970, allowed the president to nominate the prime minister.
Therefore, instead of loosening Senghor’s control of the political system, the
constitutional amendment allowed him to use the office to begin grooming his chosen
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successor, Abdou Diouf, whom he immediately named Senegal s new prime minister. In
a 1976 constitutional amendment, Senghor then succeeded in changing the rules for
succession to the presidency. The previous law had stated that the president of the
National Assembly would serve as interim president in case of a presidential death or
resignation and then hold elections within a two-month period. The new amendment
made the Prime Minister the next in line for the presidency and allowed him to serve for
the remainder of the existing presidential term.(Keesing’s Record of World Events 1976)
In this way, Senghor established Diouf as next in line for the presidency and assured him
his first term in office. Then, when Senghor was ready to retire, he could simply resign
mid-term and turn his power over to Diouf.
Decentralization
Although most of Senghor’s rule was centered around consolidating political
power in a unified government, Senghor did propose some moves towards decetralization
during his time in office. The most notable example was his 1972 decision to delegate
certain responsibilities to the local level by creating communautis rurales(rural
communities-CR). These CR consisted of several villages that would oversee developing
and providing services for the community. Three hundred and twenty CR were formed,
each composed of between thirty and forty villages. While these communautQs were a
rudimentary form of decentralization, they were handicapped from inception. The CR
councils had no permanent staff and were allotted very limited resources. What
personnel they did have were representatives of the central government, and the budget
had to be approved by an official of the central government(Vengroff 2000). As a result.
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this move towards decentralization was more of a symbolic start than a truly effective
measure.
Political Parties
In the late 1960s, the UPS held complete political sway. So much so that in 1968,
the UPS was the only party to present a candidate. Senghor had no opposition, and the
electorate had no options but to simply affirm the candidates put forth by the government
(Vengroff, Creevey 1997). In 1968, Senghor won reelection with 94.11 per cent of the
electorate and 100 percent of the votes cast, while the UPS candidate list for the National
Assembly received 92.58 per cent of the electorate and 100 per cent of votes cast
(Keesing’s Record of World Events 1968). Senghor had successfully ended political
opposition to his regime.
By 1974, however, the UPS was facing problems of internal division and external
unrest among the rural population. As a result, the government decided to allow a limited
amount of political competition by allowing the establishment of the Parti Democratique
Senegalais(PDS)under leader Abdoulaye Wade. The next concession came in 1976,
when a constitutional amendment created a three-party system restricted to three set
ideologies: Marxist-Leninist, democratic-socialist, and liberal-democratic (Vengroff,
Creevey 1997). That same year, the UPS joined the Socialist International and officially
changed its name to the Parti Socialiste (PS)(Keesing’s Record of World Events 1974).
The PS then took the democratic-socialist stance leaving two other parties, the Parti
Africain de I’lndependance(PAI) and the PDS with Marxist-Leninist and liberaldemocratic positions respectively (Vengroff, Creevey 1997). In the 1978 election
following these reforms, a certain level of competition existed, and the PDS was able to
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win 18 seats in the National Assembly. The PS, however, maintained its hold on
Senegalese politics with Senghor himself winning 82 per cent of the popular vote and PS
candidates winning 82 seats in the National Assembly (Fatten 1987). This partial
loosening of political restrictions gave Senegal an outlet for expressing discontent with
government policies and as a consequence took some pressure off of the government
while increasing its legitimacy abroad (Vengroff, Creevey 1997). As a result, Senghor
was still able to maintain his political control.
Conclusion
Leopold Sedar Senghor’s term as president lasted from 1960 until his resignation
in 1981, but his leadership in Senegal reached back into the colonial period and the postWorld War II restructuring of French colonial holdings. Senghor remains one of
Senegal’s most influential leaders for his role in leading Senegal to independence and
then establishing a working governmental system in the following years. The system that
he established had an enduring influence on Senegalese politics. When Senghor first
entered the political scene, Senegal was a part of the French colony of I’Afrique
Occidentale Francaise (AOF), and when he left, it existed as an independent nation,
separate from all other African territories. Though Senghor vocally espoused the ideals
of African unity and advocated the establishment of an African federation, these dreams
were never realized, and indeed Senghor’s very actions seemed to lead towards the
fragmentation of any potential union. The effect of Senghor’s mle in Senegal was to pare
down Senegal’s interdependence with other territories until it existed as a single-party
state under Senghor’s personal mle. In following his own political interests, Senghor
reduced Senegalese politics to the borders of Senegal and from there created his own
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highly centralized government, squashing all opposition. During this time, however,
Senghor did also make steps towards greater democratic liberty. He held regular
elections throughout his rule, and, as the years progressed, even began allowing
legitimate opposition parties to compete in elections and to win some offices. Though
not exactly a liberal democracy, Senegal under Leopold Sedar Senghor did firmly
establish itself as an independent nation and begin to lay the groundwork for future
liber2ilization.
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Chapter Four:
AbdouDiouf: 1981-2000
Historical Context
On January 1, 1981, Leopold Sedar Senghor voluntarily resigned his office as
president, turning his government over to the prime minister and his chosen successor,
Abdou Diouf. Diouf was a technocrat without a strong following in his own party, and
he had not even been elected to his presidential office. The first moves Diouf would
make as president were critical to the rest of his term in office. Thus, after Senghor’s
years of carefully controlled democracy and limited party systems, Diouf decided to take
the next steps in liberalization by accepting unlimited pluralism of political parties. In
this way, he usurped the major issue of the opposition parties and diminished some of the
criticism of his regime, thus allowing himself to establish his own rule over the
government. These moves towards liberalization greatly improved the level of
democratic practice in Senegal, but they also had unintended consequences for the Diouf
regime. Diouf may have hoped that removing limitations from political parties would
fragment his opposition and give his government increased legitimacy in the international
community. The development that he did not expect, however, was the increased support
that the opposition parties would find among the population. The increasing strength of
the opposition parties at the expense of the Parti Socialiste is one of the distinguishing
characteristics of Dioufs regime.
Decentralization
In 1972, when Leopold Sedar Senghor announced a move towards
decentralization with the communautes rurales (rural communities—CR), his apparent
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steps towards decentralization actually masked his real intentions of further consolidating
his regime. In the same way, the reforms enacted during Dioufs administration may also
be of questionable origin. The intent of laws, however,is not always their effect, and so
when Dioufs restructuring allowed the presence of opposition parties in government,the
actual decentralization may have been greater than he originally planned (Vengroff
2000). This decentralization did not occur rapidly, but rather was the result of gradual
reforms. The steady progression of these reforms, however, did have a significant impact
on the Senegalese government.
After nearly ten years in power, slipping control in rural areas necessitated
Dioufs move to enact some sort of reform in both the communes and the communautos
rurales. This action granted equal status to certain municipalities that had previously
fallen under restricted categories. Additionally, the mayors were actually given authority
over their budgets, while appointees from the national government who had formerly
held budgetary power were placed under the mayor’s control. In the same way, when
these reforms were implemented in the rural communities, they resulted in budgetary
control being moved from the sous-prefet of the national government to the president of
the popularly elected council(Vengroff 2000). These reforms thus strengthened the
influence that the rural population could have over their local governments. And since
the PS had always dominated in the mral areas, this change could be very helpful in
maintaining PS control in the country.
The next efforts at decentralization were announced by Diouf in 1992. These
plans entailed the creation of regional councils, thereby creating a legislative voice at the
regional level. The implementation of these councils, however, was slow and uncertain.
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After rounds of studies and debates, the first of these regional councils did not actually
begin operating until 1997. The major uncertainty surrounding these institutions is the
role that the regional governors played in running their government. These governors
were still appointed by the president, who rotated them among the regions to keep them
from establishing a base of power from which to challenge the national government.
Since the governors controlled the implementation of all national services within the
regions, and the governors were controlled by the president, it was difficult for a vaguely
defined legislative body to act outside of the governor’s(and therefore the president’s)
permission (Vengroff 2000). Nevertheless, the creation of these regional councils was a
significant move towards the decentralization of the Senegalese government, though they
did not necessarily mean the decentralization of the power of the PS.
The power of the PS seemed threatened in 1996 when the PDS actually won the
local election in Dakar. As a result, the PS began another decentralization program
within the capital city itself, in an attempt to keep the PDS from controlling city
government in the nation’s capital. The restructuring that resulted from this plan created
forty-three communes d’arrondisement or local municipal communes. These municipal
communes replaced the original four communes that had constituted Dakar and its
suburbs. Each of these new municipal communes had its own elected council. As the PS
was drawing the districting lines, those lines were gerrymandered to ensure a PS victory.
These municipal communes, however, had no real means of funding their operations or
of hiring staff to take care of the organization. As a result, the communes
d'arrondisement were confined to a precarious place in city politics, with some city
mayors even refusing support altogether(Vengroff 2000). In this instance, the PS was
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clearly attempting to defend its power in the cities through fragmenting the voting base of
its opposition. This tactic, however,could not support the PS in its circumstances of
declining popularity with the voters.
Political Parties
Throughout Dioufs presidency, the opposition parties, particularly the PDS,
continued to grow in strength. In 1983, the PS was still decidedly dominant in the
legislature, winning 111 of 120 seats, but the PDS managed to take eight seats, and the
Rassemblement National won one seat. Incumbent Abdou Diouf(PS) won 83.45% of the
vote in the presidential election that same year with Abdoulaye Wade(PDS)taking
14.79% (Keesing’s Record of World Events 1983). Over the next few years, the PDS
continued to expand upon these small inroads into the dominance of the PS. In 1988,
amid protests against electoral fraud by the government, the PS won 103 seats in the
National Assembly and the PDS 17, while Diouf took 73% of the vote as compared to
Wade’s 25% (Keesing’s Record of World Events 1988). In 1991, Wade and four other
PDS members joined the PS in a national unity government. This arrangement was short
lived, but resulted in significant electoral reforms, namely “a new electoral code
providing for the representation of all parties at polling stations, a guaranteed secret
ballot, a lowered voting age, an easier and expanded system of voter registration,
guaranteed access to the state media for all parties and the acceptance of foreign election
monitors”(Vengroff, Creevey 1997, 208). The PDS thus continued to chip away at the
dominance of the PS.
The elections throughout the 1990s showed increased erosion of PS support and
growing strength for the PDS. In the Febmary 1993 presidential election Diouf only won
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58.4% of the vote while Wade came in with 32%. In May of that same year, the PS won
84 legislative seats while the PDS jumped to 27,leaving 9 seats for four other opposition
parties (Keesing’s Record of World Events 1993). Throughout these years, the PS was
able to hold onto its power through its good organizational networks in the rural areas
that were more difficult for other parties to reach. As a consequence, the opposition
parties dominated in urban areas while failing to win the rural vote (Vengroff, Creevey
1997). Thus, the PS maintained control of both the executive and legislative branches
throughout the 1990s.
A closer look into the local politics of the 1990s provides an illustration of the
trends in Senegalese government during Dioufs last years in office. In efforts to
maintain his power and the power of his party throughout Senegal, Diouf made key
concessions to opposition groups seeking greater representation in the government.
Diouf saw these concessions as a means of appeasing the opposition parties in order to
prevent more hostile resistance to his regime. Leading up to the planned 1995 local
elections, the opposition parties sensed their weakness in the raral areas where the PS had
traditioncilly maintained a strong organizational stracture and hold on politics. The
opposition parties therefore sought to improve their representation in local elections in
preparation for elections to the National Assembly. In the past, the voting system in local
elections had made it terribly difficult for any opposition to find a voice in local
government, thus hampering attempts at national influence. Originally, that electoral
system called for a closed list party bloc to be elected by a plurality. So, only one party
would be represented on the council under this winner-take-all policy. Given the PS’s
superior rural organization, it was almost assured of a victory. Thus, the first priority for
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the opposition parties was a reformed electoral code. The 1995 elections were actuaUy
postponed for a year during the political wrangling until this deal could be negotiated
(Vengroff 2000). This political struggle illustrated the opposition’s attempts to use the
decentralization of Senegal to defeat the ruling PS.
The resulting compromise for the 1996 local elections aUowed for more
opposition party participation in local government while still maintaining the PS s
dominance. Half of the representatives to the councils were still elected by the old
winner-take-all system. The other half, however, were allocated by proportional
representation with a simple quota and the remaining seats going to party lists by the
system of the strongest remainder. That second half allowed room for opposition parties
to be represented on the councils without taking power away from the PS. At the same
time those electoral reforms were enacted, the number of seats on those councils was also
greatly increased to insure that former PS representatives retained their seats. As a result
of these reforms, the PS was able to gauge its actual support through reasonably fair and
open elections while using the voting system to keep opposition parties from uniting
against the government party (Vengroff 2000). Although these reforms still held the
opposition parties at a disadvantage, they were a step in creating greater representation
for political dissent.
As a result of the 1996 local elections, the opposition parties won almost 2500
seats in various councils throughout the nation, leaving the PS with over 10,500 seats.
The PS only lost its control of seven municipal and eighteen rural councils and
maintained its majority on all regional councils, though opposition parties were
represented on every regional council. The average voter turnout in mral
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council elections was 45.6 percent, and it was 45.7 percent in the urban elections.
Generally acknowledged to be free and fair, these elections gave the regime the
democratic legitimacy that it needed (Vengroff 2000).
Despite its efforts to consolidate its own power throughout Senegal, the influence
of the PS was fading, and the internal factions that emerged from within the party made it
even more difficult to maintain party control. A major loss for the party came when
Moustapha Niasse withdrew from the PS,taking a significant portion of party support
along with him. These efforts on behalf of the PS to retain political control met with
repeated frustrations of growing magnitude throughout Dioufs regime. Each advance of
an opposition party or fragmentation within the PS itself placed the PS one step closer to
losing its political dominance.
Conclusion
Abdou Diouf came into the office of president as the chosen successor of Leopold
Sedar Senghor. This status carried with it advantages as well as disadvantages. On the
one hand, Diouf had the official backing of Senegal’s most respected statesman. On the
other hand, Diouf had no electoral mandate for himself. As a result of this situation,
Diouf had to prove the legitimacy of his own government while seeking to maintain the
political dominance of the PS that had been his legacy from Senghor. Diouf therefore
sought to prove his electoral base through decentralizing the governmental structure as he
simultaneously maneuvered to fragment his opposition. These efforts would produce
mixed results.
In every instance that Diouf decentralized the government,reformed electoral
codes or extended representation to opposition parties, the PS retained its electoral
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dominance. Through his reforms of the commiinautts riirales, Diouf proved the strength
of the rural support for the PS. The creation of regional councils gave greater
representation to voters at a local level while the president(and thus the PS)retained the
right to appoint the regional governors and maintain control in the regions. Even when
Diouf allowed for the reform of the local elections laws, the PS continued to win over
four times the number of seats won by all opposition parties combined. Despite these
strengths, however, Diouf and the PS steadily lost support in national elections. The
decentralization that proved the dominance of the PS also introduced an opposition that
would continue to grow in strength and ultimately challenge the PS for control of the
very office of president itself.
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Chapter Five
Abdoulaye Wade: 2000-Present
Historical Context
Abdoulaye Wade first surfaced in Senegalese politics in 1974 when the loosening
of Senegal’s political party laws allowed opposition parties to organize. Over the )^ears,
he labored with the opposition, occasionally joining coalition governments, but never for
long. Throughout the 1990s, he was steadily gaining at the polls in presidential races.
Finally, in 2000, Wade forced Diouf into a runoff for the presidential election and then
managed to win the race with 58.49% of the vote with his coalition party, Sopi
(Keesing’s Record of World Events 2000). This steady strengthening of the opposition
parties for over thirty years illustrates Senegal’s process of institutionalizing its political
parties and developing a solid base for democracy in the years leading up to the actual
transfer of power. Since that transfer, the government of Abdoulaye Wade has faced a
number of challenges, particularly a poor economy and violence in the Casamance
region. Wade’s ability to maintain the democratic stmetures of his government in light of
these challenges will determine the future course of Senegalese democracy.
Decentralization
When Abdoulaye Wade was elected president of Senegal, he was faced with the
daunting task of revamping Senegal’s political system in order to bring greater
democratic participation to the Senegalese people. Because of his advanced years—
Wade was 74 years old when he was elected to the presidency

(Centre for Democracy

and Development 2000)—Abdoulaye Wade must form his presidential legacy,not
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through a long-term regime and personal power, but rather through the establishment of a
politic2il system that will improve the quality of the Senegalese democracy.
Upon entering office, Wade began enacting numerous reforms,chief among these
the rewriting of the Senegalese constitution. Proposed by Wade,the new constitution
was passed by referendum on January 7,2001. This new constitution instituted several
key changes from the old system, both in the legislative and executive branches. In the
legislative branch, the Senate was abolished, making the National Assembly of Senegal
unicameral. Its 120 members(reduced from 140) are directly elected for five-year terms.
The new constitution also places limits on shifting party allegiance while in office. The
principle change that the 2001 constitution brought to the executive branch is term limits.
The tenure of the Senegalese executive has gone through many revisions, changing from
seven-year terms to five-year terms and alternating between having term limits and not
having them with these fluctuations mostly depending upon the convenience of those in
office. Under Senegal’s current constitution, the president may serve a maximum of two,
five-year terms (“People in Power; Senegal” 13 March 2003). These reforms served to
streamline the legislative process and to prevent the presidency from once again reverting
to dictatorial rule.
Among other reforms enacted under Wade’s presidency are changes to the voting
system. When electing representatives to the National Assembly,the candidates are
divided into two lists: regional and national. Those mnning at the regional level are
elected by a majority system while those running on the national level are elected by a
proportional system. This system can be overly complex, however, as voters found in the
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2001 legislative elections when they were faced with 25 different ballots(“Wade
Coalition on Track for Big Majority" 2 May 2001).
At the regional level, Wade’s government had received some electoral validation
of its national victory. In May 2002, the PDS and its coalition partners won control of
nine out of eleven regional councils, forty-one communes(“Press Widely Comments” 18
May 2002) and the majority of Senegal’s 320 rural communities(“Ruling Party Leads in
Senegal’s Municipal Elections”, 14 May 2002). This victory was significant for the PDS
and its coalition because it had traditionally been weakest in the outlying areas of
Senegal. Thus, its victory in these regional governments was evidence of strong support
for the new government throughout the nation.
Though the new regime has enacted many reforms, it still faces many difficulties.
Chief among these problems is the economic slump that Senegal continues to struggle
through. In 2002, the United Nations released its Development Programme report on the
poor Senegalese economy. President Wade sought to defend his government when the
report was released, insisting that the problems described in the report were the result of
the previous regime’s policies. According to that report, the poverty rate in Senegal has
risen from 33 percent in 1990 to 65 percent in 1999. Droughts and poor harvests in rural
areas are only exacerbating these problems as the majority of the Senegalese population
th

depends on agriculture for its income. The UNDP report thus placed Senegal 158
according to the Human Development Index (“Senegal Not Concerned by UN Report,
Says Wade, 26 July 2002). Despite Wade’s protests that these figures are a reflection of
the previous regime, the poor economic situation that these numbers reflect still weighs
heavily upon his time in office. Wade must take measures to improve the Senegalese
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economy if he is to maintain the legitimacy of his government in the eyes of the
Senegalese population.
Another significant challenge that the Wade presidency faces is that of the
Casamance region. A long-time hotspot in Senegal, the Casamance is the southernmost
region on the nation, nestled just below The Gambia, Guerilla fighters have been battling
for the independence of the region since 1982(West Africa: Forgotten Conflict Lingers
On,6 March 2003). Abdulaye Wade declared the problems in Casamance a top priority
of his government when he was elected to office and even managed to sign a provisional
peace agreement with the rebels in the Casamance in March 2001. Since that time,
however, the leadership of the separatist fighters has splintered and various groups have
continued the fighting, despite the cease-fire agreement. This ongoing rebellion has
created turmoil in the region, killing 3000 since its start in 1982(“Blood and Confusion
in Casamance” 29 January 2003). This secessionist conflict is destabilizing the region
and presenting a great challenge to Wade’s ability to maintain a cohesive government.
Political Parties
In examining the party structure of Senegal, the system of political parties today
remains strong, though it is facing some difficulties. After winning the presidential
election in 2000, the Sopi coalition has won a majority in the legislature with 89 seats,
leaving the Alliance of Progress Forces and the PS as the principle opposition parties
with 11 and 10 seats respectively (Keesing’s Record of World Events 2000). In the local
elections of May 2002, the Sopi coalition won 9 out of 11 regional Councils, and 41 out
of 67 communes (“Press Widely Comments” 18 May 2002). Thus, the government party
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is still strong, but party competition remains, and no one party is allowed to dominate
completely.
However, in considering some of the attributes of a fiilly institutionalized party
system, Senegal has a mixed record. As far as regularity in patterns of party competition,
Senegal was consistent throughout the late 1980s and 1990s until the election of 2000.
Using Mainwaring’s (1998) formula for measuring electoral volatility (adding the net
change in percentage of votes gained or lost by each party from one election to the next
and dividing by two) Senegal averaged around 10 throughout the 80s and 90s,and then
jumped to over 20 with the 2000 election. In comparison to other third wave countries,
however, these scores are reasonable, even with the 2000 score of 20. AsMainwaring
(1998) discusses, the mean country volatility was 9.7 for industrial democracies and 20.5
for older Latin American democracies. Thus, Senegal scores reasonably well in the
regularity of its patterns of competition.
Two other factors of an institutionalized party system are the consistency of party
voting within the population and the longevity of the political parties themselves.
Senegal scores fairly well on both of these counts. Although the Parti Socialiste has seen
a dramatic drop in its voter support in comparison to its days of total dominance,this
change was not sudden. Rather, over a period of nearly two decades, the Senegalese
people shifted their loyalty from the PS to the PDS. This slow transition shows a certain
consistency in party voting that changed over time as one party responded to the demands
of the people whereas the other did not. Also, both of the main political parties, the Parti
Democratique Senegalais and the Parti Socialiste, are fairly long-lived. The PS has its
roots in the 1940s, pre-independence era, and the PDS was founded during the 1970s
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(Vengroff, Creevcy 1997). Although these tenures may be short in comparison to the
political parties of much older democracies, they are fairly substantial for a nation with
only 43 years of independence and three years of recognized democracy. Senegal may
not score as well in these two categories when compared with much older democracies,
but overall, it exhibits a solid performance above that of many other third wave
democracies.
The main area in which Senegal may fall short is that of party vs. personality
voting. Beginning with the Parti Socialist founder, Liopold S^dar Senghor, and now
with current president and founder of the PDS, Abdoulaye Wade,the Senegalese tend to
identify with the individuals of the party. A recent electoral controversy has centered
around the PDS wanting to use Wade’s name and picture on their ballots for the
legislative election, even though Wade was not mnning for office himself(“Dakar Press
Focuses Suit” 30 March 2001). Although this technique was stmck down by the
Senegalese Constitutional Court, this proposed strategy illustrates the pull that the
personality of Abdoulaye Wade, and not just the PDS itself, has in elections. This
practice of focusing on specific personalities instead of groups is deep rooted in
Senegalese history, according to William J. Foltz, From French West Africa to the Mali
Federation (1965). Foltz writes that this custom is practiced regularly on the local level
as political interest groups are ruled by local personalities called clans. As Mainwaring
describes it, “an election is personalistic if citizens cast their ballots more on the basis of
a candidate’s personal appeal than on the basis of party profile”(1998,76). This practice
of identifying with particular people may be a flaw in the institutionalization of Senegal’s
political parties.
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A self-acknowledged Haw in Senegal’s party system is that it allows too many
parties. In striking contrast to Senegalese politics a few decades ago,today’s system is so
open to new parties as to be overwhelming to the average voter. Around 60 political
parties exist in Senegal today, 25 of which ran a candidate in the 2001 legislative election
(“Senegalese President Wants Party Politics Regimented” 29 April 2001). Twenty-five
ballots for a single election is excessive, especially when in the last parliamentary
elections, only 8 parties and the Sopi coalition won seats. In answer to this problem,
President Wade has proposed a system for limiting parties, requiring a minimum score at
the previous election for parties that have participated in a previous election or a
minimum number of endorsements for first-time parties. A more manageable number of
parties would cut down on election expenses and organizational problems(Senegal
Envisages Party Pre-Conditions for Elections” 28 May 2(X)1). Though the large number
of parties in Senegal can be harmful to its democratic consolidation, the current
administration is tciking steps to rectify this situation and improve the stability of
Senegal’s democratic future.
Conclusion
Overall, political parties in Senegal are well institutionalized and are aiding in Senegal’s
democratic consolidation. Transitions to democracy are seldom flawless, and Senegal’s
has its faults, but for nearly thirty years the nation has been steadily progressing towards
a more democratic system. Through continued vigilance and reform,Senegal should be
able to continue this pattern with the help of its party system. Senegal’s two main
problems—personalistic elections and a multiplicity of parties—should come to a head in
the next few years. The current administration is taking steps to rectify the difficulty of
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excessive pLinics, and the next elections will reveal the efficacy of those efforts. Also,
when the aging Wade turns over the leadership of his party, the Senegalese people will
have the opportunity to show in the elections whether their support of PDS was based
solely on Wade’s personality or w hether it will continue even as the party takes on new
faces. Given Senegal’s history of democratization and the solid base it has been growing
in the past thirty years with its institutionalized piwty system, the nation should continue
down its current path towards a more consolidated democracy.
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Conclusion
Decentralization and political parties have played a major role in shaping
Senegalese government from the early twentieth century up to the present. Beginning
with French colonialism, Senegal was arranged in a highly centralized system, with all
authority coming directly from Paris. In a partial application of the French policy of
assimilation, however, parts of Senegal were given citizen status and allowed to
participate in some limited forms of elected government. This policy laid the
groundwork for the Senegalese experience with democracy,started the process of
decentralization and gave birth to Senegal’s first modem political parties.
Throughout the decolonization process, Senegal’s political parties grew in number
and strength with the Bloc Democratique Senegalais (later to become the Parti Socialiste)
rising to dominate all other political parties within Senegal. During this same time,
however, French West Africa was becoming increasingly fragmented as policies fiom
France forced the division of the large colony into its sub-units. Though Senegalese
leader Leopold Sedar Senghor pushed for an African union, the decentralization set in
motion by the French achieved a momentum too forceful to counter, and Senegal ended
this period as an independent nation in 1960.
Despite the decentralization that occurred during the decolonization process as
Senegal broke away from the larger colony and from France, the new nation of Senegal
remained highly centralized within its own borders. For the next twenty years Senegalese
president Leopold Sedar Senghor would work to create a highly centralized governmental
system centered around his own single party—the Parti Socialiste(PS). Senghor’s
presidency was a time during which Senegal stabilized itself as an independent country
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and established its own govcmnienial structures. Though this period was vital in proving
Senegal as an independent nation, this time did not see much democratic development as
Senghor eliminated political opposition and cemented his own hold on political power in
Senegal.
The next phase in Senegalese hi.story is the presidency of Abdou Diouf,Senghor’s
chosen successor. During this period beginning in 1981, Diouf sought to maintain the
dominance of the Parti Socialiste while also looking for electoral legitimacy for his own
regime. As a result, Diouf introduced reforms that decentralized political power and
allowed a greater number of opposition parties to enter the political arena. Though the
Parti Socialiste retained control of government for another twenty years, Dioufs hold on
power was slipping as the Piirii Democratique Senegalais under leader Abdoulaye Wade
challenged the dominance of the Parti Socialiste.
The final chapter of Senegalese history to be examined in this study begins with
the transfer of power from the Parti Socialiste and Abdou Diouf to opposition candidate
Abdoulaye Wade and the Sopi Coalition. This peaceful transfer of power in 2000 was
the first time since Senegalese independence that leadership of the nation had left the
hands of the Parti Socialiste. This change came about through the decentralization
process that had begun under Diouf and through the increased organization and activism
of opposition p2irties. Since that change in governments has taken place, Wade has
stmggled to improve the economic stability of the nation and to settle the conflict that has
been raging in the southern region of Casamance. Throughout the period since Wade’s
election, however, the party system in Senegal has remained stable and is becoming
institutionalized. The plurality of parties and the continued existence of opposition has

48

kept Senega] from reverting to the centralized nature of a one party system and helped its

I

transition to a liberal democracy.
This process of democratization through decentralization and political parties has
been a gradual one for Senegal, beginning in the colonial period and stretching into the
present day. That transition has, however, been a steady one, and Senegal’s current
leadership is taking steps to continue increasing the level of democracy in Senegal.

I

Senegal still struggles with economic difficulties, but the freedom of competition among
political parties and the decentralization of control from the national government will

I
continue to aid the development of liberal democracy in Senegal.

I
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Appendix I
Tables of Presidential
and Legislative Elections
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Presidential and Legislative Elections
1983-1993
1983 Legislative Election
Party

Seats in National Assembly
111

Parti Socialiste(PS)

8

Parti Democratique Senegalais(PDS

1983 Presidential Election
Candidate (Party)

Percentage of national vote
83%

Abdou Diouf(PS)

14.79%

Abdoulaye Wade(PDS)

1988 Legislative Election
Party

Seats in National Assembly
103

Parti Socialiste(PS)

17

Parti Democratique Senegalais(PDS

1988 Presidential Election
Candidate(Party)

Percentage of national vote

Abdou Diouf(PS)

73%

Abdoulaye Wade(PDS)

25%

1993 Legislative Election
Party

Seats in National Assembly
84
27
9

Parti Socialiste(PS)
Peuti Democratique Senegalais(PDS
other

1993 Presidential Election
Candidate(Party)
Abdou Diouf(PS)
Abdoulaye Wade(PDS)

Percentage of national vote
58%
32%

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, Abdou Diouf and the Parti Socialiste met with
declining electoral support as Abdoulaye Wade and the PDS increased in popularity.
Source; Keesing's Record of World Events

Transfer of Power 2000
2000 Legislative Election
Party

Seats in National Assembly
10

Parti Socialiste(PS)
Parti Democratique Senegalais
(PDS)and Sopi Coalition
Alliance for Progress

89
11

2000 Presidential Election
Candidate(Party)
Abdou Diouf(PS)
Abdoulaye Wade(PDS)

Percentage of national vote
41.50%
58.50%

The 2000 presidential and legislative elections marked the first transfer of power from
the PS to a candidate from another party. In this election, Abdoulaye Wade became
only the third president of independent Senegal.
Source: Keesing's Record of World Events
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